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traditional view. There is no present indication of a trend away from it, but
on the contrary the rule appears to be static .° The rationale behind this view
is that general words alone do not necessarily import an intent to hold an
indemnitor liable to an indemnitee for damages resulting from the negligence
of the latter; for an obligation so extraordinary and so harsh should be
expressed in clear and unequivocal terms.° The court in the case at bar
does not accept the majority rule, but on the contrary, holds that one need
not expressly refer to negligence in the contract, where the terms of the
indemnification contract were so broad as to be all-inclusive.
It is believed that the able dissent of Justice McGhee which interprets
the law in this question to be that where the parties fail to refer expressly
to negligence in their contract, such failure evidences the parties' intention
not to provide for indemnification against the indemnitee's negligent acts is
both the better interpretational effort and the sounder view. Public policy
requires such contracts to be restricted rather than extended, for the liability
of the indemnitor for the indemnitee's negligence is regarded as so hazardous,
and the character of the indemnity so unusual, that there can be no presump-
tion that the indemnitor intended to assume it in the absence of express
stipulations. This conclusion is based upon the traditional view holding for
strict construction of indemnity contracts. To hold otherwise would be to
put a premium on negligence rather than to discourage it.
RAYMOND J. DOWD
Joint Accounts—Establishment of Deceased Donor Depositor's Intent.—
Idaho First National Bank v. First National Bank of Caldwell.'---Action
brought by administrator to recover certain funds deposited in a joint bank
account of the decedent, his nephew and the nephew's wife, co-defendants
with depositee of the funds, and also to determine ownership of certain land
sales contracts executed by decedent and to also determine title to a promis-
sory note on which the decedent was payee, proceeds from both of which
& Son Co., 236 Mass. 98, 127 N.E. 532 (1920); George Dingledy Lumber Co. v. Erie
R. Co., 102 Ohio 236, 131 N.E. 723 (1921); Southern P. Co. v. Layman, 173 Or. 275,
145 P.2d 295 (1944).
5 Annot., 175 A.L.R. 1 (1948).
6 Perry v. Payne, 217 Pa. 252, 66 Atl. 553 (1907) ; but it appears that the rule of
strict construction of indemnity contract is relaxed where the indemnitor is a professional
such as an insurance company. Most courts do not in such instances require an express
reference to negligence, but hold the indemnitor liable for the principal's negligence if
such an intent can be inferred from the contract of indemnifity. Maryland Cas. Co. v.
Tighe, 115 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1940); Roche v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
273 N.Y. 473, 6 N.E.2d 410 (1936); National Bank of Tacoma v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 161 Wash. 239, 296 Pac. 831 (1931); Fitzgerald v. Milwaukee Automobile
Ins. Co. et al., 226 Wis. 520, 277 N.W. 183 (1938).
1 340 P.2d 1094 (Idaho 1959).
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were to be deposited in the joint account. The sales contract and the promis-
sory note were held by the bank as escrow and collecting agent. Deceased
had executed in writing the joint account agreement with nephew and
nephew's wife, declaring that ". . . all funds deposited heretofore and here-
after by said joint depositors or either of them, with said bank, to be owned
by them jointly with right of survivorship . . . ." The lower court found
defendants did not sustain the burden of proving decedent's intention to
make an inter vivos gift either of the funds in the account or of the land
sales contracts or the promissory note, the account being deemed to have
been established solely for the business necessity and convenience of the
deceased. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed. Held: When
money in a joint account is deposited by one party and a question arises as
to whether the depositor intended to make a gift of any of the funds de-
posited, the party asserting ownership of the funds through a gift must
prove the elements of the gift by clear and convincing evidence.
The Court dismissed summarily the appellants' claim to title of the
land sales contracts and to the promissory note because of their total failure
to sustain the burden of proving a gift inter vivos of such; the arrangement
as to the deposit of funds received from such sources into the joint bank
account does not substantiate a claim of a property right therein. In its
determination of the rights to the funds in the joint account, the Court by
its ruling reduced even further the effectiveness of the written agreement
establishing a joint interest in the funds of the account.
Various legal principles have been adopted to judicially reconcile the
interests of the parties to joint account agreements, the result of which has
been to compound the discord among the various jurisdictions; theories of
trust, contract, gift and joint tenancy have been utilized at various times
to determine the ownership of joint account funds. 2
 The overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions has adopted the gift theory 3 as did Idaho in the
leading case of Gray v. Gray.4 It was there held that a valid gift of a joint
interest was made at the time of the signing of the joint account agreement
by the parties and the donee survivor had title to all funds of the account
upon the death intestate of the donor depositor. The court there stated that
a joint account agreement, similar in both substance and form to that in the
instant case not only subjected the funds of the account to the exculpatory
2 For an excellent discussion of the various theories and their merit see Kepner,
The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account—A Concept Without a Name, 41 Calif. L.
Rev. 596 (1953-54).
a In Re Schnieder's Estate, 6 Ill. 2d 180, 127 N.E.2d 445 (1955); Ball v. Forbes, 314
Mass. 200, 49 N.E.2d 898 (1943); Millman v. Streeter, 66 R.I. 341, 19 A.2d 254 (1941),
rehearing denied, 67 R.I. 218, 21 A.2d 559 (1941); Old National Bank and Union Trust
Company v. Kendall, 14 Wash. 2d 19, 126 P.2d 603 (1942); Annot., 48 A.L.R. 189
(1927) ; 66 A.L.R. 881 (1930); 135 A.L.R. 993 (1941); 149 A.L.R. 879 (1944).
4 78 Idaho 439, 304 P.2d 650 (1956).
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provisions of the Idaho joint account statute, 5 the purpose of which was
to protect the banking interests from liability in the event of a payment of
an account's funds to either party or the survivor, but also overcame the
statutory provisions that multiparty interests are to be deemed held in
common unless declared in their creation to be joint .° The instant case relies
strongly on the fact that the purpose of the exculpatory statute was to
protect the banks rather than to establish property rights and, consequently,
the survivors' rights cannot be determined thereby.
The Court states that the rule in Gray that funds held in a joint account
agreement are held jointly has been limited by allowing, during the life of
the donor, testimony as to the intent of the donor to create other than a
joint tenancy in the funds of the account.? The instant case, however,
extends the elaborated doctrine of Gray by announcing that the joint account
agreement is not only not conclusive evidence of the intention of the donor
depositor to establish a joint tenancy in the account, but also may be rebutted
even after his death and the surviving co-tenant has the burden of proof of
the existence of the joint tenancy once evidence of a contrary intent of the
decedent has been introduced.
It would seem from the foregoing that the Court in the instant case
could have reached the contrary conclusion that after his death the written
agreement of the parties was conclusive evidence of the donative intent of
the decedent as is statutorily declared in other jurisdictions,° and that only
a substantiation of allegations of fraud, undue influence or incompetency
shall prevent the distribution of the funds of the account accordingly.
It is believed that the holding of this case in that the presumption of
a joint tenancy of the funds of the account is rebuttable for reasons other
than fraud, undue influence, or incompetency after the death of the donor
depositor, facilitates the frustration of the expressed intention of the donor.
Even more subject to criticism is the imposition upon the donee survivor of
the additional burden of proof establishing what the agreement specifically
states after the introduction of evidence contrary to the terms of the joint
5
 26-1014 of the Idaho Code provides; "Deposit in two or more names—When a
deposit has been made, or shall hereafter be made, in any bank, in the name of two or
more persons, payable to any of such persons or payable to the survivor, or survivors,
such deposit, or any part thereof, or interest or dividend thereon, if not then attached at
law or in equity in a suit against any of said persons, may be made to any of said
persons whether the other be living or not, and such payment shall discharge the bank
making the same from its obligations, if any to either or any of such other persons or
their legal representatives for or on account of such deposit. This section shall apply to
husband and wife to all intents and purposes the same as to other persons."
I.C.A. § 55-104.
7 340 P.2d at 1099, where the Court cites Shurrum v. Watts, 80 Idaho 44, 329 P.2d
380 (1958).
8 Wash. Rev. Code § 30.20.010 (1952); Nev. Rev. Stat. 663.010; see also N.Y.
Banking Law, § 239 (as applied to savings banks).
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account agreement. However, other jurisdictions are in accord with the
conclusion of the instant case
CHARLES D. FERRIS
Labor Arbitration— Coverage of a Unilateral Noncontributory Pension
Plan.—Saks and Company, Inc. v. Saks Fifth Avenue Women's Shoe
Salespeople Committee. 1—An employer entered into a collective bargaining
agreement with a Union which provided for general arbitration,2 severance
pay, and also, the extension of an existing pension plan to these employees
covered by the contracts Later, on the advice of the pension committee the
employer refused to extend the plan to a retiring employee who requested
severance pay, the refusal being on the theory that the employee must elect
either severance pay or retirement benefits.' The union requested arbitration.
The employer contended that the issue was not arbitrable as the pension
plan was not made so by the collective bargaining agreement. In a proceed-
ing to compel arbitration before the Supreme Court, New York County, the
employer's motion to stay arbitration was granted. On appeal, the Appel-
late Division, (1st Dep't) in denying the employee's motion, and thereby
reversing the lower court, held in a three-to-two decision that although the
administration and interpretation of the pension plan was not a proper
subject matter for arbitration, there was an arbitrable question as to whether
the pension plan with the interpretation of the pension committee, satisfied
the obligations assumed by the employer under the collective bargaining
contract.
In reaching this result the court relied heavily on a case involving an
employer's right to subcontract. 5 There the court held that although a dis-
pute over such a right constituted no arbitrable issue under a broad arbitra-
tion clause, there was an arbitrable question as to whether the subcontract
was bona fide or a mere subterfuge to avoid the obligations of the collective
bargaining agreement.
Much dissatisfaction with the rulings of the State courts in the labor
arbitration field6 can be traced to their adherence to the Cutler Hammer
9 Mitts v. Williams, 319 Mich. 417, 29 N.W.2d 841 (1947); In Re Hickmotts
Estate, 256 App. Div. 1047, 10 N.Y.S.2d 918 (4th Dept 1939).
1 192 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1959).
2 "Any claim, dispute, grievance or difference arising out of, or relating to this
agreement ... shall be submitted to arbitration."
3 "Any pension plan, additional vacation or holiday granted to the salespeople in the
New York Store generally shall also be extended automatically to employees covered
by this contract. When available, the details of the Pension Plan now in effect and
subject to ratification by the stockholders shall be communicated to the shoe salespeople
of Departments 23 and 723."
4 The pension committee construed a clause in the plan which, for eligibility, an
employee, ". . shall not be a participant or be eligible for participation in any
plan providing retirement or similar benefits ...."
5 Matter of Otis Elevator Co. (Carney) 6 N.Y.2d 360, 189 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1959).
6 See Kharas and Koretz, Judicial Determination of the Arbitrable Issue in Labor
Arbitration, 7 Syracuse L. Rev. 193 (1956), Summers, Judicial Review of Labor
Arbitration or Alice Through a Looking Glass, 2 Buffalo L. Rev. I (1952).
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